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RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Petitioner and Appellant Alonzo Cahoon (hereinafter "Mr. Cahoon") takes issue 
with the accuracy of several statements made by Hinckley Town and Hinckley Town 
Appeal Authority (hereinafter "Hinckley Town") in their Statement of the Facts. One 
statement requires particular attention. Hinckley Town asserts that Mr. Cahoon's fence is 
built within the 30 foot setback. (See Appellee's Brief, page 6.) This is a legal 
conclusion, and is the primary issue of dispute in this case. It is not an undisputed fact. 
ARGUMENT 
I. HINCKLEY TOWN'S ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF 'GENERAL 
PURPOSE' AND 'COMMON MEANING9 INTERPRETATION FAIL TO 
OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION THAT ZONING ORDINANCES MUST 
BE CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE PROPERTY OWNER; THE 
LANGUAGE IN THE ORDINANCE ITSELF SUPPORTS REVERSAL OF 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION. 
It bears repeating that, "zoning ordinances . . . restricting property uses should be 
strictly construed, and provisions permitting property uses should be liberally construed 
in favor of the property owner." Rogers v. West Valley City, 2006 UT App 302, ]} 15, 142 
P.3d 554; see also, Brown v. Sandy City Bel of Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207, 210 (Utah App. 
1998); Patterson v. Utah County Bd of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 606 (Utah App. 1995). 
This legal doctrine is dispositive of the present case. It is noteworthy that throughout its 
brief, Hinckley Town has failed to respond to, cite to, or appropriately address this legal 
principle. Instead, Hinckley Town has argued that the Recital should serve as a general 
purpose statement for Hinckley Town's ordinances, and that this Court should find that 
the intent and purpose as set forth in the Recital, and the common meaning of the term 
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'front yard', should control the outcome in this case. However, such a position 
contradicts Utah case law, and also contradicts the meaning and implication of Hinckley 
Town's own ordinances. Brown v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment is directly on point. 
"[W]e will not find a violation of law simply because the permitted use may appear 
inconsistent with the general intent statement when the use is in compliance with the 
substantive provisions of the ordinance." Brown, 957 P.2d at 212. Thus, when "the use 
of the property] has met the legal requirements of [the ordinance]" the proposed use 
must be permitted. Id. 
By arguing that the Recital can serve as a general purpose statement, Hinckley 
Town has forgotten, again, that unpublished and uncodified ordinance amendments 
cannot take effect or be enforceable law. In order for a general purpose statement 
regarding an ordinance to be enforceable, it must be included in the regularly passed 
ordinances. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-3-711, -713, -715. Thus, the Recital cannot 
serve as an enforceable general purpose statement any more than it can serve as a specific 
amendment to the fencing ordinance. The trial court found, and Hinckley Town has 
conceded, that the Recital is not enforceable law. The Recital's unenforceability is 
undisputed. The Recital cannot be considered in any manner (as a general purpose 
statement or otherwise) when deciding whether Mr. Cahoon's fence complies with 
Hinckley Town's ordinances, because it is not the law. 
Viewing the ordinance in the complete absence of the Recital, it is equally clear 
that the 'common meaning' approach advocated by Hinckley Town is also unavailing. 
The ordinance contains within it definitions of the different yard requirements, including 
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a definition for "Front Yard." (Addendum: Hinckley Town Code 10-4-8(A); R. 135.) 
The only indication in that definition regarding set back measurements refers to the "lot 
or parcel" of the property in question. Id. 'Lot' is defined as, "A tract of land, esp. one 
having specific boundaries." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 966 (8th ed. 2004). By 
referencing the lot, and thereby the boundaries of a particular parcel of property, the 
ordinance implies that the set back is measured on the basis of the boundaries of the 
property. Mr. Cahoon is entitled, per Rogers, Brown, Patterson, and others, to have this 
ordinance construed in favor of his proposed use. 
With few other options, Hinckley Town now asserts that this Court should simply 
adopt a 'common meaning' definition of the term 'front yard' and rule against Mr. 
Cahoon. In other words, in the face of an actual statutory definition for the term 'front 
yard' in Hinckley Town's ordinances, Hinckley Town asks this Court to somehow take 
notice of the 'common meaning' of the term 'front yard'. Hinckley Town does this 
without any evidence regarding what the common meaning actually is, and without any 
citation to the record. Hinckley Town's statutory definition of the term 'front yard' 
references the boundaries of the property. This Court is bound to give that definition 
meaning and value, and to not depart from its implications. Indeed, Mr. Cahoon is 
entitled to have that definition "liberally construed in [his] favor". Rogers, 2006 UT App 
302, f^ 15. Thus, this Court should reject Hinckley Town's argument that the 'common 
meaning' of the term 'front yard' can supersede the actual language of the statutory 
definition. 
- 3 -
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Hinckley Town has another problem with its 'common meaning' argument: it was 
not preserved below. Hinckley Town raises this 'common meaning' argument for the 
first time on appeal. This matter has been through multiple iterations: before the 
Hinckley Town Council, through planning and zoning, through the Hinckley Town 
Appeal Authority, and through the district court. Not until now has Hinckley Town 
asserted that the proper interpretation of the term 'front yard' should depart from the 
language of the ordinance and follow a 'common meaning' not supported by evidence in 
the record. By not preserving this argument below, Hinckley Town has waived its ability 
to raise this issue now. 
In support of its 'common meaning' argument, Hinckley Town relies upon the 
case of M&S Cox Investments, LLC v. Provo City Corp., 2007 UT App 315, 169 P.3d 
789. Hinckley Town argues that Mr. Cahoon's proposed interpretation would render 
Hinckley Town's ordinances meaningless and therefore his interpretation cannot be 
adopted. This argument mischaracterizes the present case, and mischaracterizes the 
holding in M&S Cox. 
In M&S Cox, Provo City had passed an ordinance requiring certain pre-existing 
non-conforming uses to terminate over a number of years. M&S Cox, 2007 UT App 315, 
fflf 4-5. Those landowners who had invested money into a particular property were 
allowed an amortization period before the non-conforming use would terminate, to allow 
the landowner to recover his investment. Id. at ^ 5. One landowner, M&S Cox 
Investments, LLC, challenged the ordinance language, arguing that the amortization 
language was ambiguous and would allow for an infinite amortization period, thereby 
- 4 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
eviscerating the enforceability of the entire new statutory scheme. Id. at fflf 6-17. Both 
the trial court and this Court rejected the landowner's proposed interpretation on the basis 
of strong evidence that the language contained within the ordinance, and even the 
definition of the word 'amortization' itself, weighed heavily in favor of Provo City's 
proposed interpretation. Id. at ffl[ 32-35 In other words, reviewing the ordinance as a 
complete statutory scheme, the alleged ambiguity was non-existent. Id. When viewing 
the ordinance together, and giving meaning to all its parts, it was clear by the language of 
the ordinance itself that an infinite amortization schedule was not encompassed within the 
plain language of the ordinance. Id. Thus, in M&S Cox, interpreting the Provo City 
ordinance strictly against the city and in favor of the landowner, the language of the 
ordinance was still clear and enforceable in the manner proposed by the City. Id. 
The present case presents substantially different facts from M&S Cox, which lead 
to a different result. First, Hinckley Town has not presented any evidence regarding the 
language of the ordinance itself which supports their proposed interpretation. Hinckley 
Town fails to present such evidence because there is none. All the ordinance language 
itself is consistent with Mr. Cahoon's proposed interpretation. Instead, Hinckley Town 
has argued that this Court should adopt the Recital as a general purpose statement, and 
thereby show inconsistency with the plain language of the ordinance. As shown above, 
the Recital is not law. Fundamental principles of due process would be violated if a 
municipality were able to pass and enforce rules that are unpublished, un-codified, and 
unavailable to the public. Moreover, Hinckley Town's failure to present any evidence 
of the 'common meaning' of the term 'front yard', together with its failure to raise this 
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issue below, does not rise to the level of evidence sufficient to overturn the presumption 
that a landowner is entitled to have a zoning ordinance construed in his favor. Hinckley 
Town's statutory definition of 'front yard' implies that the measuring line for setback 
requirements is from the boundary of the property, the 'lot or parcel' line. Mr. Cahoon is 
entitled to have that definition construed in his favor, especially when Hinckley Town has 
been unable to produce hard evidence in favor of a different interpretation. 
Finally, Hinckley Town argues that Mr. Cahoon's proposed interpretation would 
render the ordinance meaningless and unenforceable. This assertion is false. Mr. 
Cahoon's fence still has to be set back thirty (30) feet from his property line, and still has 
to comply with the actual language of the ordinance. Thus, the present scenario is 
markedly distinct from M&S Cox in this regard. In M&S Cox, this Court rejected the 
proposed interpretation, in part, because it would render the entire statutory scheme 
meaningless and unenforceable. Id. at ]flf 32-35. By contrast, Hinckley Town has the 
benefit of the ability to enforce all of its ordinances as they are written. Mr. Cahoon's 
fence is set back 35 feet, 8 inches from his property line, and thereby complies with 
Hinckley Town's ordinances as they are written. 
Hinckley Town argues that Mr. Cahoon's fence is a safety hazard because it 
obstructs the view. However, this argument is pretextual and misleading. As was 
presented to the Appeal Authority, Mr. Cahoon's house borders on Hinckley's Center 
Street and on another un-built, but dedicated and platted road. (AA Hearing, R. 219-
220.) If Mr. Cahoon were to change his address so that he was addressed off of the other 
platted road, then the yard in question would become a side yard, and his set back 
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requirement would only be 24 feet. (AA Hearing, R. 219-220; Addendum: Hinckley 
Town Code 10-4-8(C), R. 135.) Thus, same house, same streets, same yards, same fence, 
and depending on the address, different set back requirements. Mr. Cahoon's fence is set 
back 25 feet, 8 inches from the edge of the road, and addressed differently, would even 
comply with Hinckley Town's proposed interpretation. (AA Hearing, R. 219-220.) The 
Hinckley Town Appeal Authority recognized the pretextual and unproductive nature of 
this safety issue argument in its own written decision. The Appeal Authority stated: 
The AA cannot change Ordinances, but we may make 
recommendations. 
Extensive discussion and testimony was devoted to Safety 
Issues in regards to this Appeal. The AA regrets this waste of 
time and resources. If only the address of this property were 
changed, and nothing else, this discussion would be mute. 
The fence in question would be in compliance. 
The AA recommends Hinckley Town find a way to treat side 
fences with regards to safety issues and also to grant leniency 
to home owners for front yard fences when needed and 
justified. 
(AA Decision, R. 39.) 
Mr. Cahoon's fence does not obstruct view, anymore than it would as a side fence 
if his house were addressed on the other street which borders his home. Hinckley Town's 
arguments that the fence is an obstruction and a safety hazard is pretextual, and not 
consistent with their own ordinance requirements. The meaning, efficacy and 
enforceability of Hinckley Town's ordinances are not thwarted by the facial 
interpretation of the ordinance proposed by Mr. Cahoon. 
Thus, this Court should follow the binding precedent in Rogers, Brown, Patterson, 
and others, and strictly construe Hinckley Town's ordinances in favor of Mr. Cahoon's 
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proposed use. Rogers, 2006 UT App 302, \ 15. Mr. Cahoon is legally entitled to have 
the zoning ordinance liberally construed in his favor. Id. Because Mr. Cahoon's "use of 
the property] has met the legal requirements of [the ordinance]" his fence permit must be 
granted and he should be allowed the freedom to enjoy and use his property. Brown, 957 
P.2dat212. 
II. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-707(2) PROVIDES THAT MR. CAHOON 
WAS ENTITLED TO A HEARING DE NOVO BEFORE THE APPEAL 
AUTHORITY AND HIS PRIOR STATEMENTS REGARDING HIS 
LAYMAN'S UNDERSTANDING OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
ORDINANCE ARE IRRELEVANT. 
Finally, it must be noted that Hinckley Town has attempted to use Mr. Cahoon's 
prior statements regarding his layman's understanding of the ordinance against him. In 
the process of seeking his fence permit, and well before retaining legal counsel, Mr. 
Cahoon had several meetings with the Hinckley Town Council and several private 
conversations with the Mayor and individual council members about his proposed fence. 
During these conversations Mr. Cahoon was repeatedly given false information about the 
requirements of the ordinance.1 Understandably, therefore, Mr. Cahoon at certain times 
made comments in reliance on these representations indicating at that his fence may not 
have complied. 
Now, Hinckley Town seeks to take advantage of Mr. Cahoon's statements, made 
before he retained counsel and became informed of his legal rights, as though they are 
1
 Mr. Cahoon does not assert that these misrepresentations were knowing or intentional, 
but only that the Town Council and the Mayor were likewise mistaken about what the 
ordinances required. 
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legally conclusive against him. A lay person's momentary statement of what they 
understand to be the law, as represented to them by persons in political power who are 
legally adverse to them, cannot in fairness be held as legally binding against him. The 
question is what the law is, not what Mr. Cahoon thought the law was at some 
intermediate step in this process. 
Moreover, once the Town Council had rejected Mr. Cahoon's fence permit 
application, Mr. Cahoon sought review through the Hinckley Town Appeal Authority. 
Utah law provides that appeal authority review of land use decisions is held de novo. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-707(2). Thus, prior legal positions and prior statements 
become irrelevant to what can be presented and what actually is presented at the appeal 
authority hearing. At Mr. Cahoon's appeal authority hearing, he repeatedly asserted, 
through counsel, that his fence facially and legally complies with Hinckley Town's 
published and codified ordinances. (AA Hearing, R. 154, 162, 189-192.) 
CONCLUSION 
For the aforementioned reasons, this Court should hold that Mr. Cahoon's fence 
complies with Hinckley Town's ordinances and reverse the decision of the Hinckley 
Town Appeal Authority and the decision of the trial court. 
DATED and SIGNED this ^ j ^ d a y of September, 2011. 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
\ /n 
/ / / 
^4M -J—s 4-*Z- .••£»*<' 5" 1~^ 
Randall L. Jeffs ^y (// 
0 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the original Reply Brief of Petitioner and Appellant Alonzo 
Cahoon, together with required copies, was hand delivered to the Clerk of the Court, in 
the Utah Court of Appeals and two copies mailed to the below named parties by placing 
the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, this day of September, 2011, 
addressed as follows: 
Kaela Jackson 
Waddingham & Associates, P.C. 
362 West Main St 
Delta, UT 84624 
left /S 
- io-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
